DISARMAMENT

Newsletter

Newsletter of the
World Disarmament Campaign
Volume 8, Number 3
June 1990

United Nations

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The cover photograph shows a tank with flowers in its barrel in front of the Opera House in Timisoara, Romania on 30 December 1989. (Photo credit: Alex Webster)

Information published by the UN Department for Disarmament Affairs may be requested from the World Disarmament Campaign, DDA, Room S-3100, United Nations, New York, N.Y. 10017, USA; or from the Geneva Branch, DDA, Palais des Nations, CH-1211, Geneva 10, Switzerland; the Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa, B.P. 2705, Lomé, Togo; the Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean, Mcal. Blas Cerdeña 450, San Isidro, Lima, Perú or the UN Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific, P.O. Box 107 Pulchowk, Kathmandu, Nepal.

Disarmament Newsletter
June 1990 - Vol.8 No. 3
The Disarmament Newsletter is published bi-monthly by the United Nations Department for Disarmament Affairs



A Czechoslovak soldier dismantles the fence along the border with Austria on 11 December 1989 (Photo credit: Belga, published in NATO Review, December 1989)

Helsinki Citizens Assembly

Czechoslovak President Vaclav Havel and Polish Solidarity leader Lech Walesa have issued a statement on democracy and civic society that supports the Helsinki Citizens Assembly which will take place in Prague in the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic from 19-21 October 1990. (See page 16.)

Individuals from the 35 countries signatory to the Helsinki Final Act of 1975 are creating a citizens' network in these CSCE countries – 33 European plus Canada and the United States.

The Havel/Walesa statement calls for co-ordinated efforts to develop democratic structures and rebuild Europe as a community of friendly, democratic, independent States. It calls for building an institutional framework at all levels, "civic as well as governmental and parliamentary." The statement supports all appropriate efforts to achieve this, including the proposal to found the Helsinki Citizens Assembly "as an instrument of international popular diplomacy."

A 1990 Prague appeal issued by the Citizens Assembly Secretariat develops some of these points further. Excerpts follow:

"The most eloquent symbol of the division of Europe and the world – the Berlin Wall – has collapsed. After many years of anxiety and insecurity, the world is entering an era of great hope. The political landscape is being transformed."

"More and more people are becoming convinced that it will be necessary to create a new type of security system and that it is possible to do away with military power blocs; it is no longer necessary to maintain troops on foreign territory; all weapons of mass destruction can be eliminated and military spending and conventional armaments can be drastically reduced."

"The Helsinki process will continue to be a uniquely useful instrument in the years of transition ahead. The peaceful transition of Europe is unthinkable without the full observance of all human and civil rights, which the governments of Europe have pledged themselves to observe at Helsinki, Madrid, Vienna and elsewhere. The emphasis placed by these accords on the interdependence of peace, security and human and social rights constitutes an invaluable framework for the non-violent democratic resolution of persistent problems."

"The all-European process of integration has to be supported by the general public and continually extended and strenghtened by the involvement of citizens of all signatory countries, including the Soviet Union, the United States and Canada."

Vienna negotiations

Both the Conventional Forces in Europe and the Confidence- and Security-Building Measures negotiations ended their sixth rounds at the end of April. While tangible results are expected to occur within the year from both sets of talks, the pace of both has slowed after a dazzling beginning. The dramatic changes in Eastern Europe, including the process towards German unification, have largely determined the course of the discussions.

Whereas these two sets of negotiations are taking place within the framework of the 35-State Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE, sometimes also called the Helsinki process), the conventional force reduction negotiation (called CFE talks, for conventional forces in Europe) is conducted between the 23 members of NATO and WTO without the participation of the neutral and non-aligned nations of Europe. The CSCE negotiation which involves all 33 European States, and Canada and the United States is a follow-up of the Conference on Confidence-and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe (the Stockholm Conference) which adopted a set of militarily significant and politically binding measures on 17 September 1986, improving on those established in Helsinki in 1975.

The two parallel negotiations were a compromise, responding both to wishes of Warsaw Treaty and neutral and non-aligned States to go beyond confidence and security-building measures and the desire of some NATO countries to seek reductions in what they saw as a threatening WTO superiority in conventional forces and armaments.

The members of the two military alliances agreed that the purpose of the CFE negotiations should be to create a stable and secure balance at lower levels by eliminating disparities prejudicial to stability and by also eliminating the capacity for surprise attack and larger scale offensive action.

The potential ramifications of the talks are impressive. The current cost of maintaining the force levels of both alliances is estimated to be $450 billion, almost half of total military spending world wide. Significant cuts as a result of a CFE treaty could therefore result in major savings for all countries concerned.

The absence of capabilities for any State to launch surprise attacks or large-scale offensive operations would considerably affect the European political environment. In addition, most of the approximately 19,000 short-range (tactical and battlefield) nuclear weapons there are deployed on German soil. Most of the targets they can reach are also on German soil. This fact has influenced the recent decision not to replace American Lance short- range missiles and nuclear artilery munitions by newer generations of these weapons, and a call by some NATO States to withdraw all NATO nuclear artillery unilaterally.

So far agreement in principle has been reached on a number of questions including equal US and Soviet troop ceilings in Central Europe at 195,000 (with the United States permitted to station an additional 30,000 troops elsewhere in Europe). There has also been agreement on overall alliance ceilings on tanks, armoured troop carriers, artillery, combat aircraft and helicopters at substantially lower levels; on the principle that no single country should possess more than 30 per cent of total remaining armaments in Europe, and extensive verification and inspection procedures.

At the end of round six in the CFE talks, diplomats in Vienna reaffirmed their commitment to reach an agreement before the end of 1990. However, a number of issues remained unresolved. Among those are definitions of tanks, combat aircraft and helicopters to be counted against agreed ceilings, overall ceilings for combat aircraft, subceilings for interceptor aircraft and ground attack helicopters.

On verification, discussions continued over the formula for calculating the number of inspections each country would be required to accept. Also slowing the negotiations were the political transformations within the Warsaw Pact, which have led to a wide variety of positions among its members and to complex inter-alliance negotiations on force withdrawals.

Diplomats at the Confidence- and Security-Building Measures talks maintain that a "summit-worthy" document will emerge from their discussions in time for signature at the planned November summit meeting of the leaders of the 35 CSCE participating States.

At the same time, it is agreed that the proposed summit document would be followed by a second stage of talks to allow for more substantive issues to be resolved. Among the elements that are likely to be included in the 1990 agreement are: a new communications system using modern technology, annual implementation review conferences, an improved process for expanding military contacts, information exchanges on military budgets, and the holding of a second seminar on military doctrines in 1991.

Soviet – US bilateral talks

Throughout the first 1990 session of the Conference on Disarmament, representatives of the Soviet and United States delegations briefed the multilateral disarmament negotiating body on the progress of their bilateral negotiations dealing with chemical weapons, strategic arms and space-based defences.

Chemical weapons

On chemical weapons, the Soviet delegate, Serguei Batsanov, and the United States delegate, Stephen Ledogar reported on the 14th and 15th rounds of their bilateral negotiations. During the first briefing, Ambassador Batsanov reported that it was hoped that the bilateral agreement on chemical weapons would be ready for signature at the forthcoming Bush-Gorbachev summit meeting in Washington, scheduled for 30 May-3 June.

Ambassador Ledogar emphasized that the delegations had devoted special attention to their "reciprocal obligations" for a bilateral agreement pending the multilateral convention being negotiated in the CD.

The essence of the agreement is to be the destruction of the bulk of both sides' chemical weapon stockpiles to "equal low levels." This level is to be 5000 tons, or twenty per cent of the current United States stockpile. While this level is ten times the level envisaged after eight years in the multilateral convention, both sides had agreed that the latter would have precedence over their bilateral agreement once it entered into force.

Complementing the Soviet-US agreement would be a number of confidence-building measures, including a total of 7 visits to facilities in each country, the first two having been scheduled for June and August 1990.

Demolition of a Soviet missile at Saryozek, USSR further to the implementation of the terms of the INF Treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union on the Eliminination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles.

Nuclear and space talks

With respect to strategic arms, Ambassador Richard Burt, head of the United States delegation for the negotiations on nuclear and space arms, reminded the Conference that Presidents Bush and Gorbachev had undertaken to resolve the remaining major issues in the START talks by the time of the Washington summit.

The Soviet decision not to link a START agreement to adherence to the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty had removed a "fundamental obstacle." The head of the Soviet delegation to the negotiations, Ambassador Yuri Nazarkin, said that ABM compliance had moved "centre-stage at the talks as one of the most contentious issues."

The question of a post-START agreement has also been a major topic, according to Ambassadors Burt and Nazarkin. While neither side was specific on what would be discussed, it is said that the new talks would focus on qualitative as well as quantitative aspects of the strategic forces on both sides – questions of warhead delivery vehicle ratios and basing modes on submarines, missiles or bombers.

The issue of cruise missiles continued to be a focus of discussion. It is known that the Soviet Union wishes the cuts being negotiated to apply to both air-launched crusie missiles (ALCMs) and sea-launched missiles (SLCMs) with a range of 600 kilometres or more, while the US position is to cut ALCMs above 800 km and SLCMs above 300 km.

Both sides had agreed to a "politically-binding declaratory approach" to SLCMs, which would not be formalized in a treaty. Whether these declarations would apply to conventional cruise missiles as well as nuclear remained unresolved.

With respect to non-deployed ballistic missiles and warheads, numerical limits had been

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agreed to be applied only to mobile ICBMs. Other points of convergence were non-encryption of telemetry data during flight tests of ballistic missiles, a 15 year term-in-force for the treaty, and a number of verification procedures which Ambassador Burt speculated might be "the single most important aspect" of the START agreement when viewed by posterity.

Ambassador Nazarkin discussed the verification system of the draft treaty and said the major component would be the the regular and "on request" on-site inspections.

The question of mobile ICBMs was a complicated one in that ensuring verification of these weapons could compromise their "survivability," a characteristic of mobile ICBMs which many see as making them more stabilizing than silo-based missiles.

Ambassador Nazarkin included in his remarks an update of the status of the Defence and Space talks, which were complemented by United States negotiator David Smith. "The development of large-scale ballistic missile defences, particularly of space-based systems, will inevitably entail both a qualitative and a quantitative build-up in strategic offensive arms as was recognized by the USSR and the United States during the negotiations towards the ABM Treaty in 1972," stated Ambassador Nazarkin.

"We believe," he continued, "that there should be an understanding that the withdrawal of one of the parties from the ABM Treaty or its violation would give the other party the right to withdraw from the START Treaty."

Ambassador Smith outlined the US objective as seeking to facilitate "a co-operative transition to a more stable deterrence which relies increasingly on non-nuclear defences against strategic ballistic missiles, should they prove feasible." To this end, his delegation sought "to assure full testing rights for advanced defensive technologies and to free space-based ABM radars and their substitutes from outdated ABM Treaty limits," including the option to deploy space-based defenses following "thorough discussions."

Under the US proposal, either party could declare its intention to deploy strategic defences by giving formal notice "and proposing specific measures for implementing a co-operative transition." These would be required to be the object of three years' discussion, after which a party would have to provide an additional six months notice before commencing deployments beyond ABM Treaty limits. This would ensure, according to Ambassador Smith "a more stable path" for deploying defences than the current alternative – which would be to exercise the "supreme interest" clause and withdraw from the ABM Treaty with only six months' notice.

South African missile capability

At its 44th session, the UN General Assembly adopted resolution 44/113 B, entitled "Nuclear Capability of South Africa," which, *inter alia*, called upon the Secretary-General to investigate reports of alleged collaboration between Israel and South Africa in development of a South African nuclear-tipped missile.

The three experts appointed by the Secretary-General to assist him in the investigation held their first meeting in Vienna and Geneva, from 16 to 20 April 1990, where they held a number of consultations with officials of the International Atomic Energy Agency and relevant governmental delegations, as well as with representatives of the Organization of African Unity (OAU). The group is to meet again in July at the OAU headquarters where it will conduct further consultations with that organization, as well as with representatives of the front-line States and other interested States, before finalizing its report for the 45th session of the General Assembly.

NPT Prep Com finalizes work

A third and final session of the Preparatory Committee for the Fouth Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons met in Geneva from 23 April to 2 May 1990, to finalize its report. The PrepCom, as it is known, prepared its recommendations on such matters as the agenda, allocation of items to the three main committees, rules of procedure, financing and other modalities.

The Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), signed in 1968 as a measure to curb the spread of nuclear weapons, commands the broadest adherence of any multilateral disarmament agreement, with 142 accessions. The Fourth NPT Review Conference is to be held in Geneva, from 20 August to 14 September 1990. It is the last of the conferences, held every five years, provided for in the Treaty to review its implementation, before a conference to be held in 1995 decides whether the Treaty will continue in force indefinitely, or be extended for an additional period or periods. That decision will be taken by a simple majority of the Parties to the Treaty.

Round-up of first 1990 CD session

The Conference on Disarmament, the only multilateral disarmament negotiating body with representation from the entire geopolitical spectrum, held the first part of its 1990 session from 6 February to 26 April, at the Palais des Nations in Geneva.

The Conference, having its origin in the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee in 1962, now has a membership of 40, consisting of the five nuclear-weapon States (China, France, Soviet Union, United Kingdom and United States) and 35 other countries: Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Cuba, Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, Egypt, Ethiopia, German Democratic Republic, Federal Republic of Germany, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Italy, Japan, Kenya, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Myanmar, Netherlands, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Poland, Romania, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Venezuela, Yugoslavia and Zaire.

The Conference under varying names and with a growing membership has negotiated or contributed to a number of multilateral treaties, namely: the Partial Test Ban Treaty of 1963, the Outer Space Treaty of 1967, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968, the Sea-bed Treaty of 1971, the Biological Weapons Convention of 1972 and, most recently, the Environmental Modification Treaty of 1977.

Although the Conference in its current format has not yet produced a complete disarmament treaty, it is widely expected to agree on a Chemical Weapons Convention in the near future which would ban the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons, and ensure their destruction.

This past session was characterized by a certain amount of selfexamination on the role of the Conference, as member States sought to adjust to the new circumstances in international security. Many expressed the view that the Conference was in danger of "losing credibility" if it was not able to match the progress in the "real world" with significant multilateral disarmament agreements.

A number of members proposed that new agenda items be added to the Conference's programme of work, to include such measures as naval and regional disarmament. Also at issue was the current grouping of members into the Western, Socialist, and Non-Aligned (Group of 21) groups and China, and the decision-making system requiring consensus as compared with the system in the precursor bodies to the Conference where decisions were taken on the recommendation of the two Chairmen, the Soviet Union and the United States, sometimes without consensus.

Expansion of membership

The Conference reaffirmed its earlier decision to expand its membership by not more than four, with one country each to be nominated by the Socialist and Western Groups and two by the Group of 21. While the Western Group has nominated Norway and the Socialists Viet Nam, a dispute in the past with China over the latter nomination has produced a stalemate. In the meanwhile, the Group of 21 has postponed its nominations. The changing nature of the roles of the military alliances in Europe may also lead to reassments of the situation.

1990 agenda

Within the framework of its permanent agenda, the Conference considered the following disarmament issues: nuclear-test ban; cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament; prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters; chemical weapons; prevention of an arms race in outer space; effective arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons; new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons, radiological weapons; and a comprehensive programme of disarmament.

Nuclear-test ban

The Conference was once again unable to reach agreement on a mandate for an *ad hoc* committee to deal with this issue, in spite of the efforts of Japan to reconcile the differences of opinion as to whether an *ad hoc* committee should be given a negotiating mandate, or pursue work to the extent possible in the absence of such a mandate. Discussions have particularly revolved around a Czechoslovak proposal which is viewed as offering the most hope for convergence. It was hoped that the gap could be bridged before the second part of the 1990 session.

Group of scientific experts

Ola Dahlman of Sweden, chairman of the *ad hoc* Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-opertaive Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events, gave a progress report on its work.

The Group of Scientific Experts (GSE), which has been meeting since 1976, is working on the establishment of a global network of

seismic detection to facilitate the verification of compliance with a comprehensive test ban. It is currently in the process of co-ordinating a Second Large-Scale Technical Test (GSETT-2), an experiment in which data from seismometers around the globe is exchanged, the current second phase of which involves the trial testing of the existing facilities of the global system.

A major goal of the experiment is the development of seismological analysis procedures with four Experimental International Data Centres, located in Canberra, Moscow, Stockholm and Washington. Mr. Dahlman noted that operating the system "in the real world differs considerably from conceptually describing it." He recalled that during the Group's first Technical Test in 1984, a message was received from one station saying "no data avilable – seismometer stolen," a problem which occurred again during the current experiment.

A number of delegations proposed that the GSE's mandate be expanded to include other methods of detection such as remote satellite sensing and the monitoring of atmospheric radioactivity.

Nuclear disarmament;

The Conference continued to be unable to reach agreement on the establishment of *ad hoc* committees to consider items of its programme of work on the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament and on the prevention of nuclear war. Progress was made on the items as the Conference agreed to duplicate a procedure followed during the 1987 session, by which it held informal, closed meetings, the essence of which would be reflected in the Conference's annual report.

Military exercises with clothing designed to protect the wearer against chemical weapons.(Photo credit: US Army, published in NATO Review, May 1986)

Chemical weapons

A heightened awareness of the human devastation that can be inflicted by chemical weapons has catapulted this agenda item into the forefront of the CD's work. Substantial political momentum was added with the holding of the Paris Conference on Chemical Weapons in January 1989. This event was followed by the Canberra Conference of September of that same year in which representatives of governments and the chemical industry took part.

Progress towards a bilateral agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union, the two countries with the largest CW stockpiles, has also added momentum to the multilateral negotiations for a convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction.

The Conference reestablished its *ad hoc* committee for the duration of the 1990 session on 15 February with a mandate which many delegations described as much improved. For the first time, the committee was not precluded from entering into the final drafting stage of its work on the convention.

In addition to the 40 members of the CD, an unprecedented 36 other States requested and were granted participation in the CW negotiations, in conformity with the Paris Final Declaration which had

accepted that all countries should be welcomed to participate in the work for a ban on chemical weapons

The *ad hoc* committee on chemical weapons established three working groups dealing with, respectively, verification (working group A), technical matters (working group B) and legal and institutional matters (working group C). Progress was made in working group A on detailed inspection procedures in cases of alleged use of chemical weapons, incorporating the work of the UN Secretary-General's report on this matter (A/44/561). Procedures for challenge inspection of non-production still needed work, and a recent FRG proposal for *ad hoc* verification was under consideration.

The technical working group elaborated a multilateral basis of work on the issue of the "order of destruction" of chemical weapons stocks.

This important step became possible after the United States and the Soviet Union tabled as a proposal the order of destruction that they had agreed on in their bilateral chemical weapons talks. On the basis of the schedule then elaborated by the technical working group, all weapons would be destroyed within ten years of the convention's entry into force.The "schedule 1" weapons would be destroyed beginning one year after entry into force, and a "levelling out" would take place after eight years.

It should be noted in this regard that the Soviet-US agreement on chemical weapons, expected to be signed at their June summit meeting, would level out both sides' stocks to 5,000 tons each at this time, 20% of the current US stockpile each. Soviet stock piles are believed to be somewhatlarger; the agreed reduction would therefore be asymmetrical.

Should the permitted level of stocks be lower in the multilateral convention, the US and the USSR agreed that a multilateral agreement would take precedence over any bilateral treaty. The technical working group also agreed that "Schedule 2" weapons would be destroyed within five years.

Progress was made also regarding arrangements for the destruction of facilities. Meanwhile, the legal and institutional working group made progress on the contentious points concerning amendments, settlement of disputes, and possible sanctions.

The question of the relationship between the Convention and the 1925 Geneva Protocol, which bans the use of chemical weapons but not their development, production or stockpiling, remained to be resolved.

Outer space

A pre-negotiating *ad hoc* committee on this agenda item was again established. The mandate is unchanged since 1985. It calls upon the committee "to continue to examine, and to identify, through substantive and general consideration, issues relevant to the prevention of an arms race in outer space."

Having been established, the committee subsequently found itself unable to agree on its programme of work. The Western Group had proposed giving equal weight and time to each of several items: (a) examination and identification of issues relevant to the prevention of an arms race in outer space; (b) existing agreements to prevent an arms race in outer space; and (c) existing proposals and future initiatives on prevention of an arms race in outer space.

The Group of 21 opposed the equal weight option on the grounds that the first item had previously been subject to sufficient deliberation.

Security assurances

The Conference was able to reestablish its *ad hoc* committee on what are commonly know as negative security assurances (NSAs), but made little progress. Each of the groups reiterated their positions:

China unconditionally undertakes not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear countries and nuclear-free zones. The United States undertakes not to use nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear country party to the non-proliferation Treaty or any having undertaken a comparable binding commitment not to acquire nuclear explosive devices, except in the case of "attack on the United States, its territory or armed forces, or its allies, by such a State allied to or associated with a nuclear weapons State in carrying out or sustaining the attack."

The USSR undertakes not to use nuclear weapons against any State renouncing production and acquisiton of such weapons that does not have them on their territories. The policy of the United Kingdom is similar to that of the United States, and France has its own parallel formulation.

In a significant development, the representative of Nigeria submitted the text of a "proposed agreement on the prohibition of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons" (CD/967).

New weaponsof mass destruction

The Conference reestablished its *ad hoc* committee on radiological weapons "with a view to reaching agreement on a convention prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons." Its work continued to follow a "two-track" approach to the question, namely towards the prohibition of radiological weapons *per se* on the one hand and on the prohibition of attacks against nuclear facilities on the other.

Radiological weapons as such are not known to have been developed, but a possible method of radiological warfare causing massive and widespread damage to persons could be released through the dissemination of radioactive substances during an attacks on a nuclear facility.

Wide divergences of opinion prevented any significant progress.

Comprehensive programme of disarmament

Following a recommendation in 1989 by the *ad hoc* committee for that year, no *ad hoc* committee was established on the matter of a comprehensive programme of disarmament. In its report, the committee said that it had agreed to "resume work with a view to resolving the outstanding issues in the near future, when circumstances are more conducive to making progress in this regard." In December of 1989, the General Assembly adopted its resolution A/44/119 A, in which it called upon the CD to consider resumption of the work of the *ad hoc* committee in 1991.

Test-ban Amendment Conference update

After months of deliberations and informal consultations, the States parties to the partial test-ban Treaty agreed on a provisional agenda and draft rules of procedure for the Meeting of 29 May-8 June. The Meeting was convened to organize the Conference which will consider the proposal to amend the 1963 partial test-ban Treaty into a comprehensive test ban treaty.

A breakthrough regarding arrangements was achieved under the chairmanship of Ambassador Edmond Jayasinghe of Sri Lanka who helped to reconcile a significant diversity of opinion.

The partial test-ban Amendment Conference and the Meeting for its organization are being convened following the request by one third of the parties to the Treaty. This request by 41 parties was made in March 1989 following the submission of a formal amendment proposal by six non-nuclear States parties on 5 August 1988 – the 25th anniversary of the signing of the Treaty.

Although the United States and the United Kingdom opposed the proposed amendment and the call for a conference to consider it, they and the Soviet Union, as the three Depositary States, accepted their Treaty obligation to convene the conference.

On 16 November 1989 the sponsors of the Amendment Conference tabled a General Assembly resolution – which was later adopted by a vote of 127 to 2 with 22 abstentions – calling for the conference to open in May-June 1990, with a second session scheduled for January 1991, both to be held in New York.

On the same day, the three Depositaries announced that they had sent out invitations for a two-week meeting in January 1991 in Geneva. Compromise was reachedsubsequently on the holding of a Meeting in May-June and the Conference in January, both in New York.

US President Kennedy at a 1963 press conference predicting US Senate ratification of the partial test-ban Treaty. (Credit:AP Wide World)

The timing and location having been settled, the agenda and rules of procedure for both meetings remained to be agreed upon, as was the question of financing. Consultations led to agreement on the provisional agenda and rules of procedure for the Meeting, which has been charged with the organization of the Conference.

Compromise wording was reached on the more difficult question of the decision-making process. Under the draft, "every effort will be made to adopt decisions of the Meeting by consensus."

The outstanding issue remains that of financing, with the sponsors of the Amendment Conference insisting upon use of the UN scale of assessments, and the Western Depositaries and some other parties stating that the parties should share the costs more equally since this is not a UN conference and given their opposition to the Conference being held in the first place.

It was also agreed that Non-Governmental Organizations would be permitted to attend, at their request, the opening and closing sessions of the Meeting and the sessions devoted to a general exchange of views.

Confidence-building and naval armaments

Until recently, there was little attention given to naval forces and armaments in multilateral forums. But new facts have led to a growing concern about the possible implications of these forces for international security. Pertinent factors include the enlarged areas for national economic development resulting from the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention, a perceived need for increased sea surveillance, and the overall expansion of naval forces and naval patrol and war-fighting capabilities.

A 1985 United Nations study noted that questions were raised by the ongoing modernization and expansion of navies and their operational capabilities. It also made recommendations to identify issues for negotiation on measures regarding the military uses of the world's seas as a part of the disarmament process as a whole.

Some maritime confidence-building measures have been agreed to in the past. One such agreement is the 1936 Montreux Convention which limits the right of passage of naval vessels through the Turkish Straits. Another example is the clause in the Law of the Sea Convention that requires submarines, when exercising their right to innocent passage through another State's territorial seas, to navigate on the surface and to fly their national flag.

An important measure was the 1972 agreement between the Soviet Union and the United States on the prevention of incidents on and over the high seas. It sets safety distances between naval vessels of the two parties and bans threats or simulated attacks by military ships of either party against the other's ships.

A NATO ship in the Gulf between Iran and Iraq in 1988. (Photo credit: F. Domange, published in NATO Review , February 1990)

The 1972 agreement also obliges the parties to notify each other of naval activities that may endanger the safety of the vessels of the other party. A 1973 protocol extends similar protection to civilian vessels of the parties.

Similar agreements were reached between the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom in 1986 and between the Soviet Union and the Federal Republic of Germany in 1988.

In recent years suggestions have been made for a number of confidence-building measures at sea. One idea would be the creation of "sanctuaries" for strategic nuclear missile submarines in or adjoining their State's territorial sea, where they would not be threatened by anti-submarine warfare. The rationale for this would be to safeguard the stabilizing effect of a nuclear Power's second-strike capability.

Other proposed confidence-building measures include a suggestion to relieve tensions through transparency along the lines of that sought through the Stockholm agreement covering land forces, by having annual exchanges of calendars for planned naval exercises or advance notification of such exercises.

At the 1986 Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building in Europe , agreement was reached to also report planned naval activities which have a functional relationship to land-based military activities. A multilateral agreement for avoiding incidents at sea, similar to the bilateral ones between the Soviet Union and the United States and the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom, seems to be an idea for which there could be growing support.

The mandate of the ongoing Vienna negotiations on conventional armed forces in Europe excludes naval forces.

It has been suggested by Warsaw Treaty Organization countries that negotiations on naval force reductions would be in consonance with the mandate of the Vienna negotiations, *inter alia,* to eliminate disparities prejudicial to stability and capabilities to launch surprise attacks. They argue that significantly deeper cuts in their own land forces, where they enjoy numerical superiority, should be balanced by cuts to more even capabilities in naval forces, where NATO and particularly the United States have a significant advantage.

The United States and some other NATO countries have been opposed to this. It has been argued that deep cuts in land forces would make it more important for NATO to keep sea lanes secure for the possible reinforcement of the remaining forces from North America and Europe. It is also argued that the American naval force level in particular is needed to support commitments globally to allies over vast distances.

At the same time, some NATO countries have suggested a greater degree of flexibility, and Iceland has requested that NATO prepare proposals for naval force reductions, including cuts in nuclear submarines and in numbers and types of other sea-based nuclear weapons.

In addition to long-range ballistic submarine-launched strategic nuclear weapons, a significant number of shorter- and intermediate-range weapons, including cruise missiles, are sea-based, the majority of them on surface ships. The United States has thus far declined Soviet invitations to negotiate their reduction or elimination.

None the less some United States experts with high level governmental experience have expressed interest in the idea on the grounds that nuclear weapons are the main threat to the American navy and tend to neutralize its superiority in tonnage and projection capability. As an example, it is pointed out that US Navy aircraft carriers are practically invulnerable to anything except nuclear weapons.

There are also different opinions as to whether agreements in this area can be verified without exposing design or operational secrets.

International arms transfers

One indication of the improved international climate has been the acceptance on the part of the Member States of the United Nations that the question of international arms transfers should be included on the agenda of the UN General Assembly. The issue was the subject of an Assembly resolution in 1988 for the first time, after several unsuccessful attempts.

By decision of that resolution (43/75 I), the United Nations is now conducting a study, with the assistance of governmental experts, on ways and means of promoting transparency in international transfers of conventional weapons. One of the main sponsors of that resolution, Italy, recently hosted and supported an international symposium on "Transparency in International Arms Transfers," 25-28 April, in Florence.

The symposium, which brought together a number of personalities in the field of disarmament and a group of highly qualified experts, was convened by the Department for Disarmament Affairs of the United Nations, in consultation with an Italian research institute, *Forum per i Problemi della Pace e della Guerra*.

While transparency in this area is limited because most States do not disclose information relating to arms exports, some progress has been made on the basis of military expenditures' data. A 1985 UN resolution calls on all States to submit to the UN Secretary-General each year data on military expenditure in a standardized form, which an increasing number of States now do. In the last section of the standardized form, respondent States are asked to "submit information as to whether statistics on exports of military equipment would be available" on a by-country or by-region basis. Only one State, the United States, indicated that such information was available both by country and by region, and only three indicated that the information was available by region.

While arms transfers are not regarded as causing conflicts, the United Nations Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs, Mr. Yasushi Akashi, noted at the symposium that "the generosity of suppliers made it possible for recipients to opt for military solutions in their regional disputes rather than settling them through peaceful means."

The symposium in Florence, intended to call attention to and provide further incentive for the UN expert study group, held deliberations in plenary sessions as well as in two working groups, dealing respectively with "National restraints and limitations on arms transfers in the interest of international security" and "Possible multilateral action on international arms transfers as a means of building confidence and resolving regional conflicts."

In his concluding remarks, Mr. Akashi noted "the apparent willingness on the part of both suppliers and recipients to address the issue." The participants discussed a number of issues, including the idea of an international register of arms transfers, as well as other initiatives that might be taken not only for increasing transparency in arms transfers, but also for controlling them.

Disarmament issues: comments from the perspective of the Movement of Non-Aligned countries

Q: Ambassador Pejic, in its role in the Chairmanship of the Movement of Non-Aligned countries, how would Yugoslavia assess the current situation as it relates to disarmament in the light of recent developments in international relations?

A: I would say that clearly the world is entering a new political phase with profound positive changes which I believe are irreversible. One can be hopeful that a new world is emerging. Democratization is the subject of the day – democratization within individual countries, and also on the international scene. I remember at the Non-Aligned summit at Lusaka in 1970 that non-aligned countries were the first to refer to the democratization of international relations. This change has led to a thaw in international relations. This, combined with an economic need to make changes, has made it clear that decreasing the quantity and quality of armaments must follow; there would be no logic in continuing as before.

Q: Do you think it will be possible to get some conventional disarmament in different parts of the world to match the conventional disarmament that is taking place in Europe?

A: Europe is the continent where the most arms were concentrated and where there was the most tension. So I think it is very positive that it is the continent where the most substantive negotiations are going on in the field of conventional disarmament. I think this will gradually influence other parts of the world. Of course the situation is not the same in all areas of the world, but I think that what is happening in Europe will contribute to discussions in other regions.

Q: What other regions do you think might initiate more extensive measures for disarmament, and how do you see the possibility of the Mediterranean region as a region for arms limitation?

A: As you know, in Europe, the CSCE process has given us a decade of discussions of confidence-building measures. Also, the interest in the transformation of the military blocs in Europe giving more emphasis to their political aspects has created a positive atmosphere for the opening of the process in the conventional field that is not matched elsewhere. The other regions that do already have some institutionalized organizations will probably be in the best position to start discussions on conventional disarmament. I would like it very much if the Mediterranean came first.

Q: What are the prospects there?

A: Yugoslavia, as a Mediterranean country, has always emphasized the co-operation of the Mediterranean non-aligned countries, and also other countries in the region. Some forms of co-operation already exist in the Mediterranean region, not so much in the field of disarmament, but in other fields. We have had several regional meetings of non-aligned countries in Malta and in my own country, and the next meeting at the ministerial level will be in Algiers. We hope that the CSCE follow-up meeting on the Mediterranean, to be held in Palma de Mallorca, will contribute to the strengthening of confidence and security in the region. The emphasis will be on economic, cultural, ecological and trade co-operation. At the same time, the participating non-aligned countries have always emphasized the need for having the CSCE process in Europe encompass the Mediterranean.

Q: How would this work?

A: In many of the CSCE discussions the question of European security in the Mediterranean was always emphasized by the non-aligned and neutral countries. But how to involve the Mediterranean region is a very sensitive question. You have non-aligned countries, members of the alliances, developing countries and highly developed countries. I think that, exactly because of this complexity, we Mediterranean countries should initiate more contacts to begin the processes of disarmament that are of particular interest to the Mediterranean countries and which must be an integral part of the whole world process.

Q: As the date of the Fourth Review Conference of the non-proliferation Treaty of 1968 approaches, how do the member States of the Movement of Non-Aligned countries view the importance of the NPT?

A: The Fourth Review Conference will obviously be held in a totally different environment from the previous review conference due to the changes that I mentioned earlier. In my view the NPT is one of the most important international agreements ever signed in the field of disarmament. Of course there are differences between the countries in the international community on the value of the agreement. For Yugoslavia, we have always supported it strongly. At the same time, we recognize that the objections to its limitations in a way have contributed to the processes that are now being opened in the field of disarmament. We believe of course that the NPT should be strengthened; it is really a very fundamental goal to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Now that we are talking about the destruction of nuclear weapons, the issue of non-proliferation is all the more important. The majority of non-aligned countries feel that the approach cannot be partial; the Treaty must be implemented in its entirety.

Ambassordor Dragoslav Pejic of Yugoslavia (Photo credit: United Nations)

Q: In view of this, what are the prospects for the Review Conference later this year?

A: The atmosphere is positive. Certain results have already been achieved by signing the INF Treaty, and by the prospect of a START strategic weapons reduction agreement between the Soviet Union and the United States, by the imminent ratification of the threshold test-ban Treaty and the peaceful nuclear explosions Treaty. All this should reflect positively on implementing the NPT. And of course the non-aligned always emphasize the particular responsibility of the nuclear Powers; very much depends on what they do.

Q: The question of a comprehensive test ban was raised at earlier review conferences. What is your view regarding that question?

A: As you know there are still differences on this and the idea of a comprehensive test ban is still just a strong wish, although one that is shared by the vast majority of countries. At the same time we believe that a comprehensive test ban must be a logical extension of the partial test ban, and I think that the realization of a comprehensive test ban would have a very positive effect on the whole process towards nuclear disarmament.

Q: Do you think some progress could be made in that regard in the CD, in the PTBT amendment conference, or in some other way?

A: I think the different approaches have to be combined. Yugoslavia and the non-aligned countries would like to have the CD deal with this, but we all know that there is opposition to the CD going into the substance of the matter. For this reason, Indonesia, Mexico, Peru, Sri Lanka, Venezuela and Yugoslavia initiated the idea of amending the partial test-ban Treaty, and this was supported fully by the non-aligned countries at the last summit. This will be the first multilateral negotiating conference on this subject. I think both approaches are needed.

Q: In the non-aligned statement from Belgrade, a reference was also made to the role of the United Nations in the area of disarmament. Is there any particular way you think that role should be exercised more fully?

A: I think that the UN played an exceptional role when there was deep confrontation between the two major military Powers and their two military alliances. I think the UN played a role in the field of disarmament that was probably second only to the role it played in the process of decolonization. By involving itself in the field of disarmament the United Nations has made an important contribution to these positive processes that we are having now. Of course, as I have said, nuclear disarmament depends on the nuclear-weapon States, above all on the United States and the Soviet Union, but I would say that the constant interest and the constant active involvement of other countries through the UN requesting the elimination of confrontation and contributing some initiatives has had a very positive effect on the process that we have now. In the view of the non-aligned countries, the UN could usefully play an even more important role in the years to come because there are many complex issues on the table for negotiations on disarmament. In many areas such as chemical and conventional, there cannot be disarmament without the support of the whole international community.

Q: What role can the non-aligned countries play in this?

A: Of course we are now at a stage where various positive changes are just starting and everything is new and one has to see how things will develop. So I would say that the non-aligned should review the situation and work out the concrete ways to take realistic initiatives with which we can step forward on the international scene in the field of disarmament, because I must frankly say that we at the moment have not demonstrated as much new initiative as we could.

Q: Do you see any role for a time-bound programme for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons, as mentioned in the Belgrade statement?

A: The non-aligned have always wanted to see this process speed up. I think that all the initiatives

where there was a time-frame for achieving results were positive in expressing that desire.

Q: Do you see any way to prevent the transfer of arms to third world countries as the major military States reduce their demand for armaments?

A: There is that danger, but I believe that the real way to decrease it is to intensify the process that has started already for the resolution of regional conflicts by peaceful means. Examples have been set by the success in southern Africa, especially Namibia, the cease-fire in the Iran-Iraq war with the help of the UN and the efforts being made with the help of the UN in Cambodia. By the elimination of such regional problems, the tension between the countries in these regions will decrease and there will then be much less demand for armaments. This, I think, is the only way to reduce the international transfer of arms.

Q: What steps do you think are needed to reach agreement for a comprehensive ban on chemical weapons in the CD?

A: The process going on in Geneva is somewhat slow; there were predictions that we would have the Convention by now. There are many aspects of the subject which I understand are complicated, but we are now moving in the right direction, and it is definite that we shall have a convention. It helps that some of the verification problems concerning various areas of disarmament are being worked out. The meetings in Paris,and in Canberra and the non-aligned summit in Belgrade all contributed to the political support for a convention and also made it clear that most States believe it will be essential to have comprehensive ban on chemical weapons.

Q: Is there any other issue on which you would like to comment in the field of disarmament and international security?

A: The new type of détente between the major military alliances leads me to believe that the process of disarmament will really be speeded up, that solutions to regional problems will be encouraged and that this will, in turn, have a positive effect on the process of disarmament. New elements are being recognized as necessary for security. I was encouraged by the agreement reached at the recent special session of the General Assembly on international economic co-operation because economic development is becoming a vital component of global stability and security not only for developing countries, but also for the entire international community.

Indian Ocean committee

The *ad hoc* commitee on the Indian Ocean concluded its first of two sessions for 1990, with its Chairman expressing a "sense of deep distress" over the decision of France, the United Kingdom and the United States to withdraw from the committee, and the non-participation of all but two of the other Western States belonging to the committee.

The committee has been meeting since its inception in 1972, with a view to studying practical measures to implement the objectives of the 1971 "Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace." A decision was taken by the General Assembly in 1979 to convene a Conference on the Indian Ocean at Colombo, Sri Lanka, in 1981. But the inability of the *ad hoc* committee to make definitive progress on the preparations for the Conference have forced its postponement a number of times.

In three separate notes verbales dated 11 April, the three Western permanent members of the Security Council declared that they were withdrawing from the committee because the principle of consensus which had guided the work of the Ad Hoc committee since its inception had been broken with the introduction of a resolution during the 44th General Assembly which did not have the support of 10 of the 11 Western members of the committee. Exception was also taken to that same resolution's calling for the convening of the Colombo conference in spite of the fact that the committee had continued to be unable to agree on what subjects the Conference should discuss.

The United States called the 1971 Declaration "obsolete," and said that the Indian Ocean peace process would not be viable so long as it was based on the Declaration.

The non-aligned members of the committee insisted that the Declaration remained relevant, and stressed that their group had "spared no effort" to reach a consensus resolution during the General Assembly.

Science, technology and global security

"New Trends in Science and Technology: Implications for International Peace and Security" was the title of a UN Conference held at Sendai, Japan from 16-19 April 1990.

Some 50 scientists, technical experts, scholars, diplomats and political leaders from 23 countries took part in the conference which addressed a number of issues that relate technological change to current world security conditions. United States Congressman George Brown and Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Vladimir Petrovsky both addressed the topic, "New Technologies and the Search for Security."

Working groups discussed: approaches to technology assessment; trends regarding material technology; information technology and biotechnology; dealing with the international consequences of technological change; and trends in space technology and nuclear technology.

In an opening statement on "Technological Change and Global Society," United Nations Under-Secretary-General Yasushi Akashi said the Conference was called upon to take stock of the future at a time of enormous political change accompanied by a resurgence of nationalism and a growing gap between rich and poor countries.

He noted several interrelated trends – global integration, proliferation of military capability, vulnerability to new technologies, and new transparency through remote observation. He said that on the one hand, we may be moving towards a more dynamic, interdependent global society where the incentives for conflict may be reduced, but that, on the other hand, we may be witnessing the emergence of a more vulnerable and heavily armed global society in which both the means and the destructive consequences of conflict may be greater.

Explaining the interest of the United Nations in the subject, Mr. Akashi said that for many years the vast majority of Member States had registered concern over the enormous levels of resources devoted to military R&D, and they hoped that such resources would be redeployed for civilian purposes. There was also a deep resolve, he said, to stem the widening gap between industrialized and developing countries and to urge the application of scientific and technological developments to improving the ability of the developing world to participate in the modern global economy.

In a closing statement, Mr. Akashi indicated some of the broad themes and areas of agreement that had emerged during the Conference.

First, traditional definitions of national security were seen as increasingly inadequate. Instead, military security had to be complemented by ideas of international economic well-being, ecological and even cultural security. Clearly, he said, poverty and environmental decay reinforced each other and planted the seeds for further instability and tensions.

A related theme was that global peace and security depended in large measure on a more equitable distribution of existing technologies. Thirdly, while global interdependence pointed to broader areas of common interest among nations that would tend to suppress the impulse to unilateral action, it also carried the potential for tension.

Unfortunately, the international community was not well postured to deal positively and constructively with some of the disruptive side-effects stemming from the diffusion of science and technology throughout the world, Mr. Akashi continued, and the very distribution of technologies that one would wish to encourage might also give strength to certain forces one would wish to suppress, such as terrorism, sub-national violence, drug-trafficking and ethnic and religious intolerance.

A fifth theme that had woven its way through the Conference discussions indicated that technological progress was essentially value neutral. It could be used for defensive or offensive purposes and it had both civilian and military applications. These dualities raised the stakes for international cooperation, but also made such cooperation more difficult to achieve. At a minimum, it would seem that a process of dialogue and mutual reassurance would be required to see that innovations with military applications did not trigger suspicions or competitive responses.

The final theme identified from the discussions pertained to ethical responsibility. When discussing the idea of a code of conduct for scientists, participants had felt that it was difficult to achieve a proper balance between scientific freedom and social responsibility, but it was hoped that ethical choices would be informed by a global perspective and a long-range viewpoint.

NGO news items

The brief report below on activities of non-governmental organizations includes some of the events and programmes which have come to the attention of the United Nations Department for Disarmament Affairs. The coverage does not imply any judgement by the United Nations.

Americans Talk Security has published Report No. 1 on its Survey 13 on the peace dividend as the public sees it. 24% of the national sample questioned in February and March 1990 felt that Soviet aggression around the world was an extremely serious or very serious threat to US national security. Issues that were most viewed as extremely or very serious were drug trafficking, third world nuclear weapons, air and water pollution, and violent crime; these views were held respectively by 84%, 74%, 74% and 72% of informants. For information on ATS surveys, **Contact**: Americans Talk Security, 83 Church Street, Unit 17, Winchester, MA 01890 (Tel: 617-721-0266, FAX: 617-729-5571)

The **Helsinki Citizens Assembly** is developing a network of leading citizens from all 35 countries signatory to the Helsinki Final Act who endorse the "1990 Prague Appeal". The first Helsinki Citizens Assembly will take place in Prague, Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, from 19-21 October 1990. Its five proposed themes are: "Civil society as a vehicle to integrate Europe," "Demilitarization and peace politics," "Economy and ecology," "National minorities," and "Human rights". **Contact**: Secretariat of the Helsinki Citizens Assembly, Prague, Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, 116 69 Praha 1, Panská 7, (Tel: 42-2-220181 or 220948 or 223051, ext. 383, 384, Telex: 122 384 csmv c)

The Society of Physical and Mathematical Biology of the German Democratic Republic is organizing the XIIth Kühlungsborn Colloquium on Philosophical and Ethical Problems of the Biosciences. The 1990 international colloquium will take place from 14 to 19 September on the subject "Prevention of a Biological and Toxin Arms Race and the Responsibility of Scientists." Scientists in various fields – biology, history, medicine, philosophy, physics, political science, and social science – and diplomats and military people will consider the prevention of misuse of biological science and the strengthening of the biological weapons Convention of 1972. There will also be an evaluation of what can be learned from the ongoing negotiations for a comprehensive chemical weapons convention. **Contact**:Tagungskomitee, XIIth Kühlungsborn Colloquium, Zentralinstitut für Molekularbiologie, Robert-Rössle-Strasse 10, Berlin-Buch, DDR - 1115 .

The **Fourth Peace Wave** leading up to the 45th anniversary of the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki on 3-9 August 1990, has added new goals to its traditional quest for freedom from the threat of nuclear holocaust through the elimination of all nuclear weapons. The Fourth Peace Wave is attempting to bring together the goals of nuclear and conventional disarmament with the resolution of the problems of underdevelopment, hunger, poverty and unemployment and the search for demo-cracy and social progress. **Contact**: Peace Wave Action Committee: 6-19-23 Shimbashi, Minato-ku, Tokyo 105 Japan (Tel: 03-431-1014, FAX: 03-431-8781, Telex: 2428048 PXWAVE J)

The 1990 **European Nuclear Disarmament (END) Convention** will take place from 3-7 July. The Convention will open in Helsinki, Finland and move to a ship that will take participants across the narrows of the Gulf of Finland toTallinn, Estonia in the Soviet Union for the closing session. END Conventions have been held annually in different European centres for the past nine years. The most recent Convention took place in Spain in 1989 where it was decided to have a two-centre meeting in Helsinki and Tallinn. END Conventions attract a large number of participants and address the most current issues that relate to nuclear disarmament and the issues that are particularly important for the region in which the meeting is held. **Contact**: END PrepCom, Fredrikinkatu 63 A6, 0010, Helsinki, Finland. (Tel: 06 933942.)

The **NGO Committee on Disarmament** (at UN Headquarters in New York) held a Forum at the United Nations from 9-11 May 1990 . The topics addressed included: security and disarmament in Europe, and in South Asia, a global approach to controlling nuclear weapons, security for the '90s and the UN role, controlling arms transfers and reducing military expenditures in relation to the peace dividend. A second Forum on 15 May examined the prospects for strengthening the prohibitions on biological weapons. Presentations included a report on the progress of negotiations on the chemical weapons convention, and expert information on the verification of biological weapons and on the military use of biological research. **Contact**: NGO Committee on Disarmament, 777 United Nations Plaza, N.Y., N.Y. 10017 (Tel: 212-687-5340 or 986-5165)